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Sharing unused vehicles is one practical solution for traffic congestion. We propose an advanced vehicle-sharing
service that maximizes the sharing of vehicles and improves traffic efficiency by coordinating user trips via an
information system. We formulate ride-sharing games that model externalities in vehicle sharing caused by
insufficient vehicle supply. We show how Bayes correlated equilibrium can coordinate players in ride-sharing
games and verify the resultant improvement in the price of anarchy.
1. Introduction
Game theory seeks to solve the traditional problems of
congestion and effective resource allocation. As populations
increasingly concentrate in big cities, congestion becomes
an increasingly critical problem. One practical solution
for congestion is sharing unused or idled resources. For
example, many vehicles inching along heavily congested
roads have empty seats, or they occupy increasingly
scarce urban parking spaces while pedestrians struggle
to hail available taxis. There are many examples of
fallow resources, including unoccupied buildings, empty
restaurants, and unemployed workers.
We propose an advanced vehicle-sharing service that
combines car sharing and ride sharing. People share
their personal vehicles, and every user can be a driver or
passenger of a shared vehicle instead of its owner. Their
trips are coordinated by a mediator system to maximize the
use of shared vehicles and improve transportation efficiency.
Considering the negative externalities caused by
insufficient vehicle supply is the presiding difference
between studies that examine vehicle sharing and those
that examine traffic routing. While players drive their
own vehicles in the traditional traffic-routing problem,
players must locate vehicles to share before riding them
in the vehicle-sharing problem. In the latter problem,
players who change routes alter vehicle availability and
impose externalities on other players—even those who are
not transiting common routes. For example, consider a
sequence in which Player 1 first drives a vehicle from A
to B, next Player 2 drives that vehicle from B to C, and
then Player 3 drives it from C to D. If Player 1 does not
complete his/her route, Player 2 and Player 3 cannot use
the vehicle even though Player 3 shares no part of his/her
route with Player 1.
The congestion game introduced by Rosenthal[1] has
been applied to analyzing traffic congestion externalities[2].
Traffic engineers know that selfish route choice behavior
diminishes the efficiency of transportation. Several studies
employ congestion games to examine how traffic can be
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controlled by coordinating the behaviors of selfish drivers[3].
Others examine the loss in welfare created by selfish traffic.
In other words, they compare the costs generated by selfish
traffic to costs under optimally controlled traffic and refer
to the difference as the price of anarchy (PoA)[4]. It seems
that selfishness also reduces the efficiency of vehicle sharing.
However, congestion games involve only externalities among
players choosing partially identical routes; they are not
useful in analyzing the externalities in vehicle sharing
caused by inadequate vehicle supply. Agatz[5] reviews
studies of vehicle sharing and notes that they do not analyze
PoA.
Hara et al.[6] apply mechanism design theory to the
coordination of selfish users in vehicle sharing. However, the
mechanism imposes complex computations of trip values
and unlimited budgets on users, and it presents practical
difficulties in implementation.
Signaling is another relatively new approach to
coordination. A mediator provides players information
to control their beliefs concerning uncertain environments
when information asymmetry exists between the mediator
and players[7, 8, 9]. Accordingly, the mediator can control
the expected payoff and the resulting choices of players.
Signaling is easily implemented via a mobile phone app that
provides information to users. Although several studies
apply signaling to transportation problems[10, 11], they
focus on traffic routing, not vehicle sharing.
This study involves coordinating selfish users of shared
vehicles via signaling. It analyzes improvements in PoA
in a manner similar to the analysis of traffic routing in
congestion games.
2. The Models
2.1 Ride-sharing games
This section prepares an analytical tool for vehicle
sharing similar to congestion games for traffic-routing
analysis. We formulate ride-sharing games that model
positive and negative externalities arising from vehicle
supply.
A ride-sharing game is defined as a tuple G =<
N ,M, T ,G,A, µ, c >. N = {1, . . . , N} is a finite set of
players. A player i ∈ N represents a user of shared vehicles.
−i represents all players except i. M = {1, . . . ,M} is a
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finite set of vehicles. Each vehicle m ∈ M has a common
seating capacity w ∈ N>0.
G =< V, E > is a directed graph featuring finite sets of
nodes V = {1, . . . , V } and edges E = {1, . . . , E}. G is a
simple graph, but each node has a loop to itself. A node
v ∈ V represents a place, and an edge e ∈ E represents a
road. Players and vehicles move on G.
T = {1, . . . , T} is a finite set of time that partitions the
day. Each player and vehicle is located on a node at time
t ∈ T and finishes a move on an edge during period (t, t+1).
R is a set of all paths with length T −1 on G. A path r =
(v1, v2, . . . , vT ) ∈ R represents a player’s roundtrip during
a day. Ai ⊂ R is a set of strategies of player i. A = ×
i∈N
Ai
is a set of strategy profiles. ai ∈ Ai is a roundtrip of player
i, and a ∈ A is a strategy profile. a−i represents a strategy
profile of all players except i.
µ(i, t,a) :< N , T ,A >→ M is a map that represents
the allocation of player i to vehicle m during each period
(t, t + 1) depending on strategy profile a. If no vehicle is
allocated to player i, µ(i, t,a) = ∅. Each vehicle m moves
together with allocated player i on the same edge where
the player moves. sm(t,a) represents the number of players
riding in vehicle m during period (t, t+1) when the strategy
profile is a.
ce(w, sm) :< N>0,N≥0 >→ R≥0 is a cost function of a
player riding in vehicle m on edge e. c = {ce|e ∈ E} is a set
of cost functions of all edges. The total cost of player i in
a day is ci(a) =
∑
et∈ai ce(w, sµ(i,t,a)(t,a)).
We consider one-shot games wherein players
simultaneously choose entire roundtrips a during one
day. We assume that the cost function ce is monotonically
decreasing for sm when sm < w and monotonically
increasing when sm ≥ w. We also assume µ so that users
choose to ride vehicles selfishly to reduce their costs. An
allocation mechanism is needed if the demand for vehicles
exceeds supply on a node or edge, but that issue lies
outside our scope of study.
2.2 Bayesian ride-sharing games
Here we consider cases wherein players have incomplete
information regarding vehicle allocation. A Bayesian
ride-sharing game is an extension of a ride-sharing game
and is defined as Gb =< N ,M, T ,G,A,X ,P, µ, c >.
X is a set of possible values of an exogenous variable
x ∈ X , which affects the allocation of vehicles µ. µ(i, t,a|x)
is the allocation of vehicles depending on x. Similarly,
sm(t,a|x) is the number of players riding on vehicle m
depending on x, and ci(a|x) is the cost to player i depending
on x. pi(x) : X → [0, 1] is a probability distribution of X for
player i, which represents his/her belief. P = {pi|i ∈ N}
is a set of probability distributions of all players. The
definitions of other elements of Gb are the same as those
in ride-sharing game G.
Examples of the exogenous variable x are initial vehicle
locations and demand information aggregated through the
Internet. Each player chooses ai to minimize his/her
expected cost, which is EX [ci] =
∑
x∈X ci(a|x)pi(x). If
all players behave selfishly, the resulting strategy profile is
a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE).
2.3 Signaling in Bayesian ride-sharing games
We use Bayes Correlated Equilibrium (BCE)[8] as a
signaling technique used by a mediator to coordinate
selfish players and improve the efficiency of vehicle sharing.
BCE is a conditional distribution σ(aˆ|x) of a random
recommendation aˆ that gives players an incentive to follow.
Given the cost function cs(a|x), the mediator’s problem
is to design an optimal recommendation that motivates
players to coordinate to minimize the mediator’s cost. The
problem is expressed as follows:
maxσ Ex[cs(aˆ|x)]
s.t.
∑
aˆ−i,x pi(x)σ(aˆ|x)ci(aˆi, aˆ−i|x) ≤∑
aˆ−i,x pi(x)σ(aˆ|x)ci(ai, aˆ−i|x), ∀i∀aˆi.
(1)
The constraint represented above is called incentive
compatibility (IC), and it renders every player unable
to reduce his/her cost by deviating from the action
recommended by the mediator.
3. Examples
Here, we show how signaling can improve the efficiency
of sharing by incentivizing players to coordinate with each
other in a Bayesian ride-sharing game. Game Gb is defined
as follows:
• N = 2, V = 3, T = 4,M ≤ 1.
• G and initial locations are shown in Figure 1. All nodes
have loop edges to themselves.
• ai must include node 3 for all players.
• A player uses the vehicle if it is located on his node.
• There is uncertainty x ∈ X = {0, 1} regarding the
availability of the vehicle. x = 0 means M = 0 and
x = 1 means M = 1.
• All players have a common prior pi(x = 0) = 0.5, ∀i.
Each player has only two distinct options such that A =
{C,D}. C = (1, 2, 3, 1) is a trip that visits nodes in this
order. On the other hand, D = (1, 1, 3, 1). All edges except
for loop edges have the same cost function. If a player does
not use the vehicle, the cost is 8. If a player drives alone,
the cost is 6. If two players share the vehicle, the cost is
1. The cost at loop edges is 0. Cost matrices of this game
appear in Tables 1 and 2.
The expected cost matrix is shown in Table 3. It has
the structure of a prisoner’s dilemma because each player
prefers to go to node 3 without picking up the car and return
home riding with another player rather than risk picking up
the car in person. Accordingly, BNE is a = (D,D), which
means that no players share the vehicle.
Now we consider a system that uses BCE to coordinate
players to share the unused vehicle. The system cost can
be denoted as cs(a|x) = ∑i∈N ci(a|x). The problem of
the system is denoted by Eq.1, which is the search for
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Figure 1: A Bayesian ride-sharing game
Table 1: ci(a1, a2|x = 0)
C D
C 20,20 20,16
D 16,20 16,16
Table 2: ci(a1, a2|x = 1)
C D
C 10,10 15,9
D 9,15 16,16
Table 3: Ex[ci(a1, a2|x)]
C D
C 15,15 17.5,12.5
D 12.5,17.5 16,16
Table 4: σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|x)
σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|0) σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|1)
C D C D
C α0 β0 C α1 β1
D β0 1− α0 − 2β0 D β1 1− α1 − 2β1
Table 5: Optimal σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|x)
σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|0) σ(aˆ1, aˆ2|1)
C D C D
C 0 0 C 0.06 0.47
D 0 1 D 0.47 0
an optimal recommendation policy σ(aˆ|x) as in Table 4.
The problem becomes one of linear programming, and
Table 5 presents a solution. This incentive-compatible
recommendation induces the coordination of players
and realizes BCE, where the system’s expected cost
Ex[cs(aˆ, x)] = 27.9, which is better than the one under
BNE, Ex[cs(a|x)] = 32. Since Ex[cs(a|x)] = 26 in social
optimum, the PoA is improved from 1.23 under BNE to
1.07 under BCE.
4. Conclusion
We have formulated ride-sharing games that model
externalities caused by insufficient vehicle supply. We
verified the coordination of selfish users by BCE and
improvements in PoA on the basis of a simple ride-sharing
game. Future studies should determine the theoretical
bounds of PoA and propose an approximate algorithm for
general games followed by practical verification.
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